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петък, 25 ноември 2016 г.

Как да противодействаме на заплахите към информационната / кибер сигурност, предизвикани от "вътрешни" ("наши" хора) ? Част 6


Combating the Insider Threat
© 2015 Lancope, Inc.

Table of Contents

Chapter One
WHO IS ATTACKING YOUR NETWORK?
Chapter Two
INSIDER THREAT MOTIVES AND METHODS
Chapter Three
DETERRING INSIDER THREATS WITH TECHNOLOGY
Chapter Four
USING NETWORK LOGS TO THWART INSIDER THREATS
Chapter Five
BEYOND TECHNOLOGY
Chapter Six
SUMMARY & TOP 10 WAYS TO COMBAT INSIDER THREATS

Chapter Six

Summary & Top 10 ways to combat insider threats

In conclusion, it is critical to recognize that insider threats come in different forms, and technologies that
stop one type of insider attack may not necessarily be effective against others. Nonetheless, it is important to adopt a comprehensive range of solutions such as access control and encryption technologies, which can play a big role in deterring insider attacks.
And don’t forget about the use of network logs, particularly NetFlow, for continuously monitoring user
activity. Advanced technologies can take the capabilities of NetFlow even further by providing additional
security context and helping organizations make sense of the plethora of data available on the network.
In the end, however, insider threat prevention is about more than just technology. Other key groups
within the organization, including HR, Management and Legal, for example, also need to join IT in the
fight against insider threats.
Please refer to the following Top 10 List for a comprehensive recap of insider threat prevention methods.

Top 10 Ways to Combat Insider Threats

1. First and foremost, it is important that your company conducts thorough background checks before
hiring employees, contractors or third-party vendors.
2. Once employees are hired and given access to sensitive systems, establishing appropriate checks and balances for access to confidential data is key.
3. Thorough measures must also be taken to revoke previous employee and contractor access to
your company’s systems.
4. Understand the different types and characteristics of insider threats – negligent, malicious and
compromised – so that you can better detect and protect against them.
5. Remember that access controls can serve as a key deterrent for both negligent and malicious insiders.
6. Additionally, encryption of data at rest is crucial for minimizing the impact should a negligent employee lose his/her laptop or other equipment.
7. Of course, user education should not be overlooked. It is a lot easier for employees to abide by best
practices if they are aware of them.
8. The collection, analysis and storage of various types of network logs should be a critical component of any insider threat security program.
9. Remember that some monitoring solutions provide additional security context, such as identity
awareness, which can be invaluable for quickly tracking down the source of insider attacks.
10. Last but not least, it is important to realize that the IT department alone cannot adequately protect a
company from its own insiders. Insider threat programs must also involve Management, HR and Legal.

сряда, 23 ноември 2016 г.

Как да противодействаме на заплахите към информационната / кибер сигурност, предизвикани от "вътрешни" ("наши" хора) ? Част 5


Combating the Insider Threat
© 2015 Lancope, Inc.

Table of Contents

Chapter One
WHO IS ATTACKING YOUR NETWORK?
Chapter Two
INSIDER THREAT MOTIVES AND METHODS
Chapter Three
DETERRING INSIDER THREATS WITH TECHNOLOGY
Chapter Four
USING NETWORK LOGS TO THWART INSIDER THREATS
Chapter Five
BEYOND TECHNOLOGY
Chapter Six
SUMMARY & TOP 10 WAYS TO COMBAT INSIDER THREATS



Chapter Five

Beyond Technology

A 2014 survey by the Ponemon Institute uncovered that only 26 percent of respondents had a multidisciplinary insider threat management program in place within their organization. It is important to
recognize that technology alone cannot prevent insider threats. It has to be a cross-organizational effort
that also involves other groups such as HR, Management and Legal.
For example, if HR alerts IT about a disgruntled employee, their network activity can be monitored so that anomalous behaviors such as logging on at unusual hours of the day can be swiftly investigated. And without the involvement of other groups within the company, malicious behaviors discovered by IT cannot be properly addressed.
Specifically, companies that wish to adequately address the insider threat problem should
consider the following:

Background Checks and Screening
First and foremost, it is important that your company conducts thorough background checks before hiring employees, contractors or third-party vendors so you will know exactly who you are working with.

Partner Evaluation
According to the 2014 U.S. State of Cybercrime Survey, “Recent contractor data leaks and payment card heists have proved that adversaries can and will infiltrate systems via third parties, but most organizations do not address third-party security.” Also according to the survey, only 44 percent of respondents have a process for evaluating third parties before the launch of business operations, and only 31 percent include security provisions in contracts with external vendors and suppliers. No matter how strong your security program is, if you are working with insecure partners, it won’t take long for the attackers to find them and use them to infiltrate your network.

Comprehensive Employee Exit Strategies
Research by the CERT Insider Threat Center has shown that malicious insiders typically conduct their
unsavory activities within 30 days of giving their resignation. It sounds obvious, but thorough measures
need to be taken to revoke employee and contractor access to your company’s systems upon
resignation. Also pay particular attention to the person’s active sessions at the time they leave, as they
may still be logged in somewhere and able to do damage if they wish.

Management Training
Also according to the CERT Insider Threat Center, insiders who commit crimes often engage
in certain behaviors prior to or in the course of committing that crime, such as threatening the
organization or bragging publicly about how much damage they could do. If managers are trained
to recognize and report these kinds of behaviors, they may identify a potential problem before it
becomes a serious security incident.

Employee Assistance
In some cases, personal and financial stress may motivate people to commit crimes at work. There are a number of steps that organizations can take to help employees find constructive approaches to handling difficult personal circumstances, such as establishing a confidential Employee Assistance Program that can provide counseling and advice.

User Education
According to a study by Forrester Research of information workers in North America and Europe, only 57 percent said they were aware of their organization’s current security policies and only 42 percent said they received training on how to stay secure at work. User education can go a long way in helping to protect against insider threats. It is a lot easier for employees to abide by best practices for security if they are aware of them, and if they are educated on the serious impact and dramatic consequences that their careless actions could have on the organization. This is especially important in light of new forms of attack such as ransomware.
Users can also be educated about helping to detect potential insider attacks by others. According to the
Verizon 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report, the most common way organizations detected insider

crimes was when employees reported them.

неделя, 20 ноември 2016 г.

Как да противодействаме на заплахите към информационната / кибер сигурност, предизвикани от "вътрешни" ("наши" хора) ? Част 4


Combating the Insider Threat
© 2015 Lancope, Inc.

Table of Contents

Chapter One
WHO IS ATTACKING YOUR NETWORK?
Chapter Two
INSIDER THREAT MOTIVES AND METHODS
Chapter Three
DETERRING INSIDER THREATS WITH TECHNOLOGY
Chapter Four
USING NETWORK LOGS TO THWART INSIDER THREATS
Chapter Five
BEYOND TECHNOLOGY
Chapter Six
SUMMARY & TOP 10 WAYS TO COMBAT INSIDER THREATS

Chapter Four

Using Network to thwart Insider Threats

While each type of insider threat requires a different combination of security measures, one technique
that can help across the board is the monitoring of network activity through various logs. According to
Lancope CTO TK Keanini, “In all cases of insider threat, early detection of the activities should be the
dominant strategy because no one, no matter how diligent, is going to be able to prevent these threats
100% of the time.” In order to effectively combat threats, organizations need a way to find out the who, what, when, where, why and how of specific attacks. By leveraging network activity logs from technologies such as firewalls, IPS systems, SIEMs, packet capture and NetFlow, organizations can turn the entire network into a security sensor and more easily be aware of and shut down insider attack attempts. All of these technologies have their strengths and weaknesses in terms of expense, level of network visibility provided, and privacy concerns, but should all be evaluated as part of an effective insider security strategy.

NetFlow for Combating Insider Threats

By collecting and analyzing metadata from throughout the entire network, NetFlow in particular
provides a wide breadth of visibility at a reasonable cost and without the privacy concerns associated
with full packet capture.
NetFlow is a protocol developed by Cisco that enables organizations to collect and analyze network traffic from existing infrastructure components including routers, switches, firewalls and others. Because it allows for the collection of network data from virtually anywhere in the network, NetFlow is an extremely valuable technology when it comes to finding and identifying insider threat actors.
Providing a 24/7 pervasive look at everything happening on a corporate network, NetFlow can be leveraged for both real-time threat detection, as well as to create a network audit trail of previous transactions for use in forensic investigations. Since it delivers visibility across the entire network environment, NetFlow can help organizations identify network activity associated with a wide range of cyber-attacks, such as unusually large file transfers or attempts to access restricted areas, for example.
In the case of the insider threat, excessive amounts of network traffic flowing from one user’s computer to the printer could signify an attempted theft of intellectual property. Or, if a user is frequently communicating with an unfamiliar IP address in another country, it could indicate that the user’s computer has been compromised. These are just a couple of examples of how the collection and analysis of NetFlow can help identify insider threats on the network. NetFlow is also valuable for baselining network assets so that administrators know where the organization’s sensitive data assets reside and how they are being used. After all, IT and security professionals cannot take the appropriate steps to secure critical assets and minimize risk if they do not know that the assets exist, or where they are located.

Detecting Suspicious Network Behaviors

According to TK Keanini, CTO of Lancope, “There is a difference between ‘bad’ and ‘not good.’ The insider threat requires you to have tools that can detect ‘not good.’” Collecting and analyzing NetFlow data with the right tools can help organizations detect a plethora of suspicious network behaviors that can indicate that an insider attack is taking place. These include:

Unauthorized Access
When a user attempts to access resources on the network that are prohibited

Policy Violations
When employees begin using services that are in direct violation of company policy, and may be intended to bypass company monitoring

Internal Reconnaissance
Before insiders can extract data, they must first inventory it. Organizations can use NetFlow to identify
associated internal scanning activities.

Suspect Data Loss
When privileged users send abnormal amounts of information out of the network

Suspect Data Hoarding
When a user is downloading and collecting a large amount of data, which may indicate an attempt to
package and exfiltrate sensitive information

Target Data Hoarding
When large amounts of data are being extracted from a specific host on the network
Detecting these behaviors early on can mean the difference between thwarting a potentially catastrophic
insider attack and becoming the victim of one. If you have the appropriate situational awareness and can
identify anomalous network activity in a timely fashion, you may just be able to shut down an attack before a privileged user makes off with your data. Unfortunately, however, it still takes more than just technology to adequately protect your business from insider threats.

Gaining Security Context with Lancope’s StealthWatch® System

While NetFlow provides a plethora of valuable information for combating network attacks, organizations
need a feasible means of collecting, storing and analyzing all of the data to turn it into actionable
intelligence for fending off advanced threats. With massive scalability and sophisticated security analytics,
Lancope’s StealthWatch® System enables organizations to make sense of all the information available on their networks, as well as quickly act on it.
By collecting and analyzing mass quantities of NetFlow and other types of data from across an
organization’s entire network, the StealthWatch System can quickly identify anomalous behaviors that
could be indicative of an attack. The system can also store months or even years’ worth of NetFlow to
facilitate more comprehensive forensic investigations into previous security incidents.
According to a May 2014 Ponemon Institute Study, the biggest hurdle to determining if insider actions
pose a threat is a lack of contextual information from security tools. That is why the StealthWatch System
provides additional layers of security context to help administrators make more informed decisions for
threat mitigation, including: user identity, device awareness, application-level visibility and threat feed data.

петък, 18 ноември 2016 г.

Киберсигурността в Израел

Israel’s cyber security frontier

The Israeli city of Beer Sheva is quickly becoming a global centre of cyber security technology

Warwick Ashford / Security Editor
ComputerWeekly.com

The southern Israeli city of Beer Sheva is used to protecting the frontier. During Roman times, it was a dusty outpost that formed part of the Limes Arabicus, a series of desert fortresses defending the empire from raiding tribes. Earlier, the Bible repeatedly cited Beer Sheva as the southern civilised limit of the Israelite kingdoms.
Even today, tourists in Beer Sheva can visit the remains of the fortress that guarded the borders of biblical Israel. But today the frontier is the internet and Beer Sheva offers protection of the electronic sort. The city is rapidly becoming a global centre of cyber security technology.
Israel exports more cyber security-related products and services than all other countries in the world combined, excluding the US. Reports from 2015 show the tiny country making 10% of all global sales in cyber security products and attracting 20% of global investment in the sector.
Much of that investment is centred on the desert city of Beer Sheva, where Israel has constructed a hub for cyber security research and development. Those investments are bolstered by the city’s physical proximity to Israel’s military technological intelligence units and the burgeoning Ben Gurion University, a significant research institution.  
At an early stage, Israel identified cyber security as an area of national importance. The small country’s technological skills and continuous concerns over security made cyber security a natural arena for national investment.
In 2010, Israel adopted its National Cyber Initiative, which established a National Cyber Bureau to advise the government on cyber security matters, encouraging co-operation between academia, industry and the defence community, and advancing Israel as a global centre of cyber technology.
Since then, the bureau has, in co-operation with other government agencies, allocated almost $100m to foster entrepreneurship and academic excellence in the field. The Israeli Office of the Chief Scientist, another government agency, has adopted a preferential policy for funding private initiatives in cyber security research and development.
In addition to the Beer Sheva centre, the bureau has also helped to establish a second academic cyber security centre at Tel – Aviv University. This latter centre has a broad interdisciplinary focus, which includes political science and legal issues. 

Cyber prowess

Observers typically ascribe Israel’s cyber prowess to its human capital – a cadre of technologists trained by a military that needs to retain cyber primacy. For example, the Israeli cloud security firm Adallom, which was acquired by Microsoft in 2015, was founded by alumni of military cyber units.
This trend dates back to 1993, when a veteran of the same unit established Checkpoint, one of the first commercial purveyors of network security software.
But this perspective, with its focus on highly trained individuals, perhaps overlooks the value that broader institutional structures provide to Israel’s cyber security ecosystem.
Economists have studied the role of government institutions in encouraging cyber security investment, asking why state support should be necessary to bolster cyber ventures. Security is a market good, and vulnerable entities will spend good money to obtain security goods and services. If so, why should any government intervention – and Israel’s government has certainly intervened – be needed to bolster cyber security investment? 
One answer is that good cyber security defence requires a wealth of information – about emerging threats, existing vulnerabilities and developing technologies. Private entities may not have the incentive or capability to share this information among themselves, and the government may have a role in providing sensitive information or encouraging information sharing.

Security information

This viewpoint can explain recent debates in the US concerning the sharing of cyber security information, debates that culminated in the passing of legislation that allowed companies to share threat information between themselves and with the government. The UK has also created frameworks for the public-private sharing of cyber security information, such as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Partnership  established in 2013.
Israel may not (yet) have express legislation that allows private entities to share cyber data, but it does have government or public institutions that facilitate informal access to such information. Most obviously, the Israeli military provides a hub where individuals share high-level threat and vulnerability information under the umbrella of the state.
In a country that has compulsory military service, and where discharged soldiers regularly come back to their units to train and serve in the reserves, it is possible to see how the military could function as an informal watering hole for the exchange of cyber security information. The establishment of the Beer Sheva and Tel-Aviv centres, and the creation of the National Cyber Bureau, add more points of contact where such information can be exchanged informally between individuals active in the industry.

Long-term strategy

In other words, Israel has constructed a set of institutions that allow for the informal flow of high-level cyber security information. Although such informal sharing cannot provide a basis for real-time response to cyber attacks, it perhaps provides a fertile bed for the development of long-term strategy and the growth of commercial ventures. 
Long after its Roman garrisons had disappeared into the desert dust, Beer Sheva played a pivotal role in British military history. Towards the end of the Second World War, General Edmund Allenby and a company of parched light horsemen overpowered the Turkish battlements that were defending the city. Once again, Beer Sheva showed its critical role in defending the Holy Land – after the battle, Jerusalem and the rest of the country swiftly fell into British hands.
Today, the cyber hub of Beer Sheva is reprising its central role in military and civilian defence, but the battlefield now plays out in digital bits instead of the arid desert, and the weapons are innovation and information-sharing rather than trenches and bayonets. And Israel is hoping these digital swords can be beaten into instruments of commercial success.


четвъртък, 17 ноември 2016 г.

Как да противодействаме на заплахите към информационната / кибер сигурност, предизвикани от "вътрешни" ("наши" хора) ? Част 3


Combating the Insider Threat
© 2015 Lancope, Inc.

Table of Contents

Chapter One
WHO IS ATTACKING YOUR NETWORK?
Chapter Two
INSIDER THREAT MOTIVES AND METHODS
Chapter Three
DETERRING INSIDER THREATS WITH TECHNOLOGY
Chapter Four
USING NETWORK LOGS TO THWART INSIDER THREATS
Chapter Five
BEYOND TECHNOLOGY
Chapter Six
SUMMARY & TOP 10 WAYS TO COMBAT INSIDER THREATS

Chapter Three

Deterring Insider Threats with Technology

Thankfully there are technologies that can help organizations deter or thwart insider threats.Here’s a look at which types of technologies are effective against each kind of insider threat.

Negligent Insiders
Various measures can be used to deter negligent activity and “keep honest people honest.”

Access Controls
Access controls can prevent people from obtaining sensitive data that they do not need in order to do their jobs. According to a December 2014 report by the Ponemon Institute, seventy-one percent of end users say that they have access to company data they should not be able to see.

Encryption of Data at Rest
Encryption of data at rest can also help prevent data loss by negligent insiders in the event that they lose
their laptops or other equipment.

Malicious Insiders

Access Controls
Access controls can also help prevent damage done by malicious insiders. Making it harder to access
sensitive data can keep honest people honest, but also put a wrench in the plans of malicious attackers.

Checks and Balances
Checks and balances are also extremely important in this arena. There should never be just one individual who has administrative access to a system, as this could essentially leave the person free to do whatever they want with the data or device – or even hold it hostage after leaving the company. Shared usernames/ passwords should also be avoided as they do not hold the individual users accountable, and could still be used by people who have since left the organization.

Logs from Endpoint Systems and Network Devices
Logs from endpoint systems and network devices can also be used to identify and investigate cases
of insider malice. For example, a case of financial fraud might be detected by examining database
logs from a credit card processing system, whereas a case of data theft might be noticed through
monitoring of network traffic.

Compromised Insiders

Compromised insiders are a much more challenging type of insider threat to combat since the real
attacker is on the outside, with a much lower risk of being identified. Typically, no amount of deterrence
will discourage them from carrying out their attack. Furthermore, traditional security solutions that focus on catching malware and exploits cannot identify the unauthorized use of legitimate accounts. In fact,
studies have shown that advanced attackers are on the network for a median of 243 days before being
detected. The use of network logs is really the only way to uncover and shut down this type of threat.




вторник, 15 ноември 2016 г.

Как да противодействаме на заплахите към информационната / кибер сигурност, предизвикани от "вътрешни" ("наши" хора) ? Част 2

Combating the Insider Threat
© 2015 Lancope, Inc.

Table of Contents

Chapter One
WHO IS ATTACKING YOUR NETWORK?
Chapter Two
INSIDER THREAT MOTIVES AND METHODS
Chapter Three
DETERRING INSIDER THREATS WITH TECHNOLOGY
Chapter Four
USING NETWORK LOGS TO THWART INSIDER THREATS
Chapter Five
BEYOND TECHNOLOGY
Chapter Six
SUMMARY & TOP 10 WAYS TO COMBAT INSIDER THREATS



Chapter Two

Insider Threat Motives & Methods

What is muleware?
Unlike malware, muleware solicits the participation of the user and offers incentives to play a small
role in the attack campaign. “Up until this point, cybercriminals have attained their resources by
exploiting and compromising devices,” said Lancope CTO, TK Keanini. “But wouldn’t it be more
efficient and much more profitable to pay for these resources and turn thousands o f would-be victims into part of the attacker’s supply chain? I envision that this new form of muleware will be based on the anonymity of Tor networking, and commerce conducted via cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin. Marketplaces will connect the demand with the supply, and cybercrime will rise to an entirely new level, a level that we are not prepared to defend against.”

Negligent Insiders
Negligent insiders are insiders who accidentally expose data. They don’t mean to do anything wrong
– they are just employees who have access to sensitive data and inadvertently lose control of it. A large number of security incidents and data breaches fit this description.
Also fitting into this category are insiders who take IT shortcuts or ignore security policies simply to make their jobs easier – for example, downloading unauthorized software, using unsecured wireless networks, or the developer who decides to set up a test site on the Internet with real data.

Malicious Insiders
Malicious insiders are employees who intentionally set out to harm the organization either by stealing data or damaging systems.

Research by the CERT Insider Threat Center at Carnegie Mellon University surrounding hundreds of real-world cases of attack by malicious insiders has shown that most incidents fit into one of three categories:
• IT Sabotage - Someone destroys data or systems on the network
• Fraud - Someone is stealing confidential data from the network for financial gain
• Theft of Intellectual Property - Someone is stealing intellectual property for competitive
advantage or business gain

Motivations for Betrayal
The motivations that turn insiders against their organizations are diverse, and can include:
Job/Career Dissatisfaction
When someone is extremely dissatisfied with their current work or career situation, they may attempt to harm their employer by destroying or stealing data.
Monetary Gain
When exposed to valuable data that could make them money on the black market, some employees will be unable to resist the temptation to steal and sell it. Others will be coerced to do so by malicious outsiders.
Espionage
Both nations and corporations have been known to plant insiders within organizations for the sole purpose of stealing trade secrets and intellectual property for espionage.
Activism
Activists are associated with a particular ideological movement, and can use the theft and exposure of confidential data to bring attention to their cause. The cases of Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden likely fall into this realm.

Compromised Insiders
A compromised insider is an employee whose access credentials or computer have been compromised by an outside attacker. According to the Cisco 2014 Annual Security Report, “Threats designed to take advantage of users’ trust in systems, applications, and the people and businesses they know are now permanent fixtures in the cyber world.” And according to the Verizon 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report, two out of three breaches exploit weak or stolen passwords.
A compromised insider is really an outsider – it is someone who has access to your network as an
authorized user, but they aren’t who they are supposed to be. Today’s attackers are frequently employing social engineering tactics to infiltrate corporate networks and execute attacks under the radar, posing as legitimate users.

Lessons Learned From Manning and Snowden

Security breaches surrounding Bradley Manning and WikiLeaks, as well as Edward Snowden and the
NSA, have made it painfully obvious that even the most seemingly impenetrable networks can fall
victim to insider threats. If nothing else, these two major incidents have finally brought the issue of the
insider threat to the foreground for many businesses.
However, it is important to realize that for every Snowden or Manning out there looking to expose
confidential secrets in the name of hacktivism, there are literally hundreds of others planning to steal data from their employer’s network simply for revenge or to make a buck.
It is not enough to think, “Well, our company isn’t doing anything wrong, so we don’t have to worry about insiders exposing our data,” or “We are just a small company so no one is after our information.” The truth is, any company’s data can be valuable when put in the right hands – whether it’s PII, credit card data, medical records or even just intellectual property – and you better believe that the attackers know this!